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LENGTH-BASED CRYPTANALYSIS: THE CASE OF
THOMPSON’S GROUP
DIMA RUINSKIY, ADI SHAMIR, AND BOAZ TSABAN
Abstract. The length-based approach is a heuristic for solving
randomly generated equations in groups that possess a reasonably
behaved length function. We describe several improvements of the
previously suggested length-based algorithms, which make them
applicable to Thompson’s group with significant success rates. In
particular, this shows that the Shpilrain-Ushakov public key cryp-
tosystem based on Thompson’s group is insecure, and suggests
that no practical public key cryptosystem based on the difficulty
of solving an equation in this group can be secure.
1. Introduction
Noncommutative groups are often suggested as a platform for public
key agreement protocols, and much research is dedicated to analyzing
existing proposals and suggesting alternative ones (see, e.g., [1, 4, 5, 6,
7, 10, 11, 12], and references therein).
One possible approach for attacking such systems was outlined by
Hughes and Tannenbaum [6]. This approach relies on the existence of
a good length function on the underlying group, i.e., a function ℓ(g)
that tends to grow as the number of generators multiplied to obtain
g grows. Such a length function can be used to solve, heuristically,
arbitrary random equations in the group [4].
In the case of the braid group, a practical realization of this approach
was suggested in [4], and the method was extended in [5] to imply high
success rates for subgroups of the braid group, which are of the type
considered in some previously suggested cryptosystems (e.g., [1]).
This length-based cryptanalysis usually has smaller success rates than
specialized attacks, but it has the advantage of being generic in the
sense that, if there is a good length function on a group, then the
attack applies with nontrivial success rates to all cryptosystems based
on this group (provided that an equation in the group can be extracted
from the public information).
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The main problem with existing length-based algorithms is that they
tend to perform well only when the underlying subgroup has few rela-
tions, i.e., it is not too far from the free group. This is not the case
in Richard Thompson’s group F , since it has a maximal set of rela-
tions: Any nontrivial relation added to it makes it abelian [3]. In 2004,
Shpilrain and Ushakov proposed a key exchange protocol that uses
Thompson’s group F as its platform and reported a complete failure
of a length-based attack on their cryptosystem [11].
In the sequel we introduce several improvements to the length-based
algorithms, which yield a tremendous boost in the success rates for full
size instances of the cryptosystem. The generalized algorithms pre-
sented here are not specific for Thompson’s group, and would be useful
in testing the security of any future cryptosystem based on combina-
torial group theoretic problems.
1.1. History and related works. The results reported here form
the first practical cryptanalysis of the Shpilrain-Ushakov cryptosystem:
The first version of our attack was announced in the BochumWorkshop
Algebraic Methods in Cryptography (November 2005) [8]. An improved
attack was announced in the CGC Bulletin in March 2006 [9].
While we were finalizing our paper for publication, a very elegant spe-
cialized attack on the same cryptosystem was announced by Matucci
[7]. The main contribution of the present paper is thus the general-
ization of the length-based algorithms to make them applicable to a
wider class of groups. Moreover, while our general attack can be easily
adapted to other possible cryptosystems based on Thompson’s group,
this may not be the case for Matucci’s specialized methods.
2. The basic length-based attack
Let G be a finitely generated group with SG = {g
±1
1 , . . . , g
±1
k } being
its set of generators. Assume that x ∈ G is generated as a product,
x = x1 · · ·xn, where each xi ∈ SG is chosen at random according to
some nontrivial (e.g., uniform) distribution on SG. Assume further that
w ∈ G is chosen in a way independent of x, and that x, w are unknown,
but z = xw ∈ G is known. Suppose that there is a “length function”
ℓ(g) on the elements of G, such that with a nontrivial probability,
ℓ(x−11 z) < ℓ(z) < ℓ(xjz)
for each xj 6= x
−1
1 . To retrieve x, we can try to “peel off” the generators
that compose it, one by one, using the following procedure.
Algorithm 1 (Length-based attack).
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(1) Let j ← 1 and y ← z.
(2) For each g ∈ SG compute g
−1y.
(3) Consider the h ∈ SG that minimizes ℓ(h
−1y). (If several such
h’s exist, choose one arbitrarily or randomly).
(4) (a) If j = n, terminate.
(b) Otherwise, Let hj ← h, j ← j+1 and y ← h
−1y and return
to step 2.
If ℓ is a good length function, then in step (3), with some nontrivial
probability, h = x1 (or at least y can be rewritten as a product of n or
fewer generators, where h is the first). It follows that with a nontrivial
(though smaller) probability, x = h1h2 · · ·hn after termination.
Instead of assuming that n is known, we can assume that there is
a known, reasonably sized, bound N on n, and then terminate the
run after N steps and consider it successful if for some k ≤ N , x =
h1 ·h2 · · ·hk. This way, we obtain a short list of N candidates for x. In
many practical situations each suggestion for a solution can be tested,
so this is equally good.
In this algorithm, as well as in the ones that follow, the decisions are
soft in the sense that if an incorrect generator is chosen at some stage,
this may be repaired later if a generator that cancels it out (using the
group relations) is chosen.
However, in practice the known length functions in many types of
groups are not good enough for Algorithm 1 to succeed with noticeable
probability. This is shown in [4], and is demonstrated further by the
Shpilrain-Ushakov key agreement protocol.
3. The Shpilrain-Ushakov Key agreement Protocol
This section is entirely based on [11].
3.1. Thompson’s group. Thompson’s group F is the infinite non-
commutative group defined by the following generators and relations:
(1) F = 〈 x0, x1, x2, . . . | x
−1
i xkxi = xk+1 (k > i) 〉
Each w ∈ F admits a unique normal form [3] which has the following
structure:
w = xi1 · · ·xirx
−1
jt
· · ·x−1j1 ,
where i1 ≤ · · · ≤ ir, j1 ≤ · · · ≤ jt, and if xi and x
−1
i both occur in this
form, then either xi+1 or x
−1
i+1 occurs as well. The transformation of
an element of F into its normal form is very efficient: Starting with a
word w of length n, the number of required operations is bounded by
a small constant multiple of n logn [11].
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Definition 1. The normal form length of an element w ∈ F , ℓNF(w),
is the number of generators in its normal form: If the normal form of
w is xi1 · · ·xirx
−1
jt · · ·x
−1
j1
, then ℓNF(w) = r + t.
3.2. The protocol.
(0) Alice and Bob agree (publicly) on subgroups A,B,W of F , such
that ab = ba for each a ∈ A and each b ∈ B.
(1) A public word w ∈ W is selected.
(2) Alice selects privately at random elements a1 ∈ A and b1 ∈ B,
computes u1 = a1wb1, and sends u1 to Bob.
(3) Bob selects privately at random elements a2 ∈ A and b2 ∈ B,
computes u2 = b2wa2, and sends u2 to Alice.
(4) Alice computes KA = a1u2b1 = a1b2wa2b1, whereas Bob com-
putes KB = b2u1a2 = b2a1wb1a2.
As a1b2 = b2a1 and a2b1 = b1a2, KA = KB and so the parties share the
same group element, from which a secret key can be derived.
3.3. Settings and parameters. Fix a natural number s ≥ 2. Let
SA = {x0x
−1
1 , . . . , x0x
−1
s }, SB = {xs+1, . . . , x2s} and SW = {x0, . . . , xs+2}.
Denote by A, B, and W the subgroups of F generated by SA, SB, and
SW , respectively. A and B commute elementwise, as required [11].
Let L be a positive integer. The words a1, a2 ∈ A, b1, b2 ∈ B, and
w ∈ W are all chosen of normal form length L, as follows: Let X be A,
B, or W . Start with the empty word, and multiply it on the right by a
(uniformly) randomly selected generator, inverted with probability 1
2
,
from the set SX . Continue this procedure until the normal form of the
word has length L.
For practical implementation of the protocol, it is suggested in [11]
to use s ∈ {3, 4, . . . , 8} and L ∈ {256, 258, . . . , 320}.
4. Success rates for the basic length attack
The cryptanalyst is given w, u1, u2, where u1 = a1wb1 and u2 =
b2wa2. This gives rise to 4 equations:
u1 = a1wb1
u2 = b2wa2
u−11 = b
−1
1 w
−1a−11
u−12 = a
−1
2 w
−1b−12
He can apply Algorithm 1 to each equation, hoping that its leftmost
unknown element will appear in the resulting list of candidates. Note
that even a single success out of the 4 runs suffices to find the shared
key.
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Here n, the number of generators multiplied to obtain each element,
is not known. We took the bound 2L on n, as experiments show that
the success probability does not increase noticeably when we increase
the bound further. This is the case in all experiments described in this
paper.
Experiments show that the success probability of finding a1 given
a1wb1 is the same as that of finding a
−1
2 given a
−1
2 w
−1b−12 , that is,
the usage of the same w in both cases does not introduce noticeable
correlations. A similar assertion holds for b2 and b
−1
1 . We may therefore
describe the task in a compact manner:
Given awb, try to recover either a or b.
The probabilities pa, pb of successfully recovering a and b (respectively)
induce the total success rate by 1− (1− pa)
2(1− pb)
2.
The attack was tested for the minimal recommended value s = 3,
and for the cut-down lengths L ∈ {4, 8, . . . , 128}. (Each attack in this
paper was tested against at least 1000 random keys, in order to evaluate
its success rates.)
The results, presented in Table 1, show that this is not a viable
attack: The recommended parameter is L ≥ 256, and already for L =
128 the attack failed in all of our tries.
Table 1. Success rates for the basic length attack (s = 3)
L a recovery b recovery Total
4 88.4% 82.6% 99.96%
8 62.3% 56.2% 97.3%
16 29.1% 26.9% 73.1%
32 10.2% 8.2% 32%
64 0.9% 1% 3.7%
128 0% 0% 0%
5. Using memory
To improve the success rates, it was suggested in [5] to keep in mem-
ory, after each step, not only the element that yielded the shortest
length, but a fixed numberM > 1 of elements with the shortest lengths
among all tested elements. Then, in the next step, all possible exten-
sions of each one of the M elements in memory with each one of the
generators are tested and again the best M elements among them are
kept (see [5] for a formal description of this algorithm).
The time and space complexities of this attack increase linearly with
M . The previous length-based attack is the special case of the memory
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attack, where M = 1. Except for pathological cases, the success rates
increase when M is increased. See [5] for more details.
We have implemented this attack against the minimal recommended
parameters s = 3, L = 256, and with each M ∈ {4, 16, 64, 256, 1024}.
The success rates appear in Table 2.
Table 2. Success rates for the basic length attack with
memory (s = 3, L = 256)
M a recovery b recovery Total
≤ 64 0% 0% 0%
256 1.5% 0.1% 3.2%
1024 5.7% 0.1% 11.3%
We see that M must be rather large in order to obtain high success
rates. The experiments in [5] yielded much higher success rates for
braid groups. The reason for this seems to be that the length-based
approach is more suitable for groups which have few relations (i.e.,
are close to being free) [4], whereas here the underlying groups have
many relations. The next section shows how to partially overcome this
problem.
6. Avoiding repetitions
During the run of the algorithm described in the previous section,
we keep a hash list. Before checking the length score of an element, we
check if it is already in the hash list (i.e., it has been considered in the
past). If it is, we drop it from the list of candidates. Otherwise, we
add it to the hash list and proceed as usual.
In the case M = 1, this forces the algorithm not to get into loops.
Thus, this improvement can be viewed as a generalization of avoiding
loops to the case of arbitrary M .
6.1. Results. The results for s = 3, L = 256 are summarized in Table
3.
It follows that our improvement is crucial for the current system:
Compare 50% for M = 1024 in Table 3 to the 11% for the same M
obtained in Table 2 before we have discarded repetitions.
A success rate of 50% should be considered a complete cryptanalysis
of the suggested cryptosystem. We will, however, describe additional
improvements, for two reasons.
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Table 3. Success rates for repetition-free memory at-
tack (s = 3, L = 256)
M a recovery b recovery Total
4 0% 0% 0%
16 2.3% 1.1% 6.6%
64 10.8% 2.3% 24%
256 14.3% 3.8% 32%
1024 20.4% 11% 49.8%
Generality. The Shpilrain-Ushakov cryptosystem is just a test case for
our algorithms. Our main aim is to obtain generic algorithms that will
also work when other groups are used, or when Thompson’s group is
used in a different way.
Iterability. As pointed out by Shpilrain [10], there is a very simple fix
for key agreement protocols that are broken with probability less than
p: Agree on k independent keys in parallel, and XOR them all to obtain
the final shared key. The probability of breaking the shared key is at
most pk. In other words, if a system broken with probability p0 or
higher is considered insecure, and k parallel keys are XORed, then the
attack on a single key should succeed in probability at least p
1/k
0 . If we
consider a parallel agreement on up to 100 keys practical, and require
the probability of breaking all of them to be below 2−64, then we must
aim at a success rate of at least 2−64/100 ≈ 64%. For p0 = 2
−32, we
should aim at 80%.
7. Interlude: Memory is better than look-ahead
An alternative extension of the basic attack is obtained by testing
in each step not just the 2k generators in SG, but all the (2k)
t t-tuples
of generators g±1i1 · · · g
±1
it
. After computing the length of each of the
peeled-off results, one takes only the first generator of the leading t-
tuple, and repeats the process. This is called look-ahead of depth t
[6, 4]. The complexity of this approach grows exponentially with t.
In order to compare this approach with the memory approach, we
should compare attacks using roughly the same number of operations.
The products of all possible t-tuples can be precomputed, so that each
step requires (2k)t group multiplications. In the memory attack, each
step requires M · 2k group multiplications. Thus, look-ahead of depth
t should be compared to M = (2k)t−1.
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7.1. Results. The look-ahead attack was tested for s = 3, L = 256.
We tried t ∈ {2, 3, 4}, which correspond to M ∈ {6, 62, 63}, respec-
tively. The results are presented in Table 4. For t = 3, 4, we have also
tried the intermediate approach where a look-ahead of depth t − i is
performed (i = 1, 2) for each member of the list and M = (2k)i.
Table 4. Success rates for look-ahead LA, memory at-
tack M, and combined M&LA (s = 3, L = 256)
a recovery b recovery Total
t M t,M LA M LA M LA M M&LA
2 6 — 0% 0.1% 0% 0.6% 0% 1.4% —
3 36 2,6 0.1% 7.4% 0.1% 3.6% 0.4% 20.3% 6.8%
4 216 2,36 1.4% 16.8% 0.8% 8.3% 4.3% 41.8% 31.2%
3,6 14.4%
It follows that increasing M is always better than using look-ahead
of similar complexity. This was also observed in [4, 5] for other settings.
8. Automorphism attacks
Recall our problem briefly: G = 〈SG〉, where SG = {g
±1
1 , . . . , g
±1
k }.
x, w ∈ G are unknown and chosen independently, and z = xw ∈ G is
known. We wish to find (a short list containing) x. Write x = h1 · · ·hn.
Let ϕ be an automorphism of G. Applying ϕ, we have that ϕ(z) =
ϕ(x)ϕ(w), and ϕ(x) = ϕ(h1) · · ·ϕ(hn). This translates the problem
into the same group generated differently: G = 〈ϕ(SG)〉, where ϕ(SG) =
{ϕ(g1)
±1, . . . , ϕ(gk)
±1}. Solving the problem in this group to find ϕ(x),
gives us x.
Solving the problem in the representation of G according to ϕ is
equivalent to solving the original problem with the alternative length
function
ℓϕ(w) = ℓ(ϕ(w)).
Indeed,
ℓ(ϕ(gi)
±1ϕ(x)ϕ(w)) = ℓ(ϕ(g±1i xw)) = ℓϕ(g
±1
i xw).
It could happen that a certain key which is not cracked by a given
length attack using a length function ℓ, would be cracked using ℓϕ.
If we choose ϕ at “random” (the canonical example being an inner
automorphism ϕ(w) = g−1wg for some “random” g), we should expect
smaller success rates, but on the other hand the introduced randomness
may be useful in one of the following ways. Let Φ be a finite set of
automorphisms of G.
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Average length attack. We can take the average length
ℓΦ(w) =
1
|Φ|
∑
ϕ∈Φ
ℓϕ(w).
If the elements ϕ of Φ are chosen independently according to some
distribution, then
lim
|Φ|→∞
ℓΦ(w) = E(ℓϕ(w)),
where the expectancy is with regards to the distribution of the chosen
elements ϕ. This approach should be useful when the length func-
tion ℓE(w) = E(ℓϕ(w)) is good. This would be the case if there are
only weak correlations between the different length functions: Roughly
speaking, if there are weak correlations between the different length
functions ℓϕ, and for a random ϕ the probability of getting a correct
generator is some p with ǫ = p − (1 − p) > 0, then for |Φ| = O(1/ǫ2),
a correct generator will get the the shortest average length ℓΦ almost
certainly.
Multiple attacks. Write Φ = {ϕ1, . . . , ϕm}. We can attack the key using
ℓϕ1. If we fail, we attack the same key again using ℓϕ2, etc. Here too, if
there are weak correlations between the different length functions and
|Φ| is large, then we are likely to succeed.
In the case of Thompson’s group F , the family of automorphisms
is well understood (they are all conjugations by elements of some well
defined larger group) [2]. However, since we are interested in “generic”
attacks, we considered only inner automorphisms.
8.1. Results. All experiments were run for parameters s = 3, L = 256
and without memory extensions (M = 1). All conjugators defining
the inner automorphisms were random elements of length 64. The
complexity of the two described attacks is similar to that of the memory
attack with M = |Φ|.
Average length attack. We tried the average length attack with |Φ| ∈
{4, 16, 64, 256, 1024}. Not a single one of the experiments was suc-
cessful. This implies either that the correlation between the different
length functions is rather high or that the actual success probability
for a given length function is very low.
Multiple attacks. The success rates appear in Table 5.
While an improvement is observed, it is also seen that there re-
main substantial correlations and the success rate does not increase
fast enough when |Φ| is increased. Comparing the results to those in
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Table 5. Success rates for the multiple attack (s =
3, L = 256)
|Φ| a recovery b recovery Total
4 0.1% 0% 0.2%
16 0.9% 0% 1.8%
64 2.2% 0% 4.4%
256 2.2% 0% 4.4%
1024 2.5% 0% 4.9%
Table 3, we see that in the current setting, increasing the memory is
far better than using many automorphisms.
9. Alternative solutions
Thus far, we have concentrated on the problem: Given w and awb,
find the original a, or rather, a short list containing a. But as Shpilrain
and Ushakov point out [12], it suffices to solve the following problem.
Problem 1 (Decomposition). Given w ∈ F and u = awb where a ∈ A
and b ∈ B, find some elements a˜ ∈ A and b˜ ∈ B, such that a˜wb˜ = awb.
Indeed, assume that the attacker, given u1 = a1wb1, finds a˜1 ∈ A
and b˜1 ∈ B, such that a˜1wb˜1 = a1wb1. Then, because u2 = b2wa2 is
known, the attacker can compute
a˜1u2b˜1 = a˜1b2wa2b˜1 = b2a˜1wb˜1a2 = b2u1a2 = KB,
and similarly for b2wa2.
Consider Problem 1. To each a˜ ∈ A we can compute its complement
b˜ = w−1a˜−1u = w−1a˜−1(awb), such that a˜wb˜ = awb. The pair a˜, b˜ is
a solution to this problem if, and only if, b˜ ∈ B. A similar comment
applies if we start with b˜ ∈ B. This involves being able to determine
whether b˜ ∈ B (or a˜ ∈ A in the second case). This membership decision
problem turns out to be trivial in our case.
A is exactly the set of all elements in F , whose normal form is of the
type
xi1 . . . ximx
−1
jm . . . x
−1
j1
,
i.e., positive and negative parts are of the same length, and in addition
ik − k < s and jk − k < s for every k = 1, . . . , m. B consists of
the elements in F , whose normal form does not contain any of the
generators x0, x1, . . . , xs (or their inverses) [11]. In both cases, the
conditions are straightforward to check.
Following is an algorithm for solving Problem 1, which incorporates
the new flexibility into the halting rule.
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Algorithm 2 (Alternative solution search).
(1) Execute Algorithm 1 (with any of the introduced extensions),
attempting to recover a.
(2) For each candidate (prefix) a˜ encountered during any step of
the algorithm, compute the complement b˜ = w−1a˜−1u.
(3) If b˜ ∈ B, halt.
Note that if the algorithm halts in step (3), then a˜, b˜ is a solution for
the decomposition problem.
The above procedure can be executed separately for each of the four
given equations. It suffices to recover a single matching pair in any of
the four runs to effectively break the cryptosystem.
9.1. When the group membership problem is hard. It should be
stressed that solving the group membership is not necessary in order
to cryptanalyze the system. Indeed, given u1 = a1wb1 and u2 = b2wa2,
we can apply Algorithm 2 to, e.g., u1 = a1wb1, replacing its step (3)
by checking whether the suggested key a˜u2b˜ succeeds in decrypting
the information encrypted between Alice and Bob. Our experiments
showed that for all reasonable parameters, this formally stronger attack
has the same success rates. However, this alternative approach is useful
in other groups, in which the membership problem is difficult.
9.2. Results. We have repeated all major experiments for s = 3, L =
256, but this time considered each alternative solution a success. We
consider only the repetition-free versions of the attacks, as they are
much more successful.
Average automorphism attack. While being substantially better than
the 0% reported in Section 8.1 before allowing alternative solutions, the
results here are still not satisfactory: For all |Φ| ∈ {4, 16, . . . , 1024},
the average rates were close to 17%. This suggests that in this setting,
the average length converges to the expected length very quickly.
Multiple attack. The success rates for the multiple attack (page 9) are
quite good when alternative solutions are accepted, as shown in Table
6.
It is observed, though, that no significant improvement is obtained
when moving from |Φ| = 256 to |Φ| = 1024 (what looks in the table
like a drop in the probability is probably a statistical fluctuation, but
it still shows that the real probability does not increase substantially).
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Table 6. Success rates for the multiple attack (s =
3, L = 256)
|Φ| a recovery b recovery Total
4 7.1% 13.7% 35.7%
16 11.3% 20.4% 50.1%
64 11.5% 23.3% 53.9%
256 16.7% 24.5% 60.4%
1024 14.5% 20.2% 53.4%
Memory attack. This attack, which corresponds to Section 6.1 but al-
lows alternative solutions, gives the best results on the studied case.
We have tried it against the minimal suggested parameters (s = 3, L =
256), as well as the maximal suggested parameters (s = 8, L = 320).
The results appear in Table 7.
Table 7. Success rates for memory attack with alterna-
tive solutions
s = 3, L = 256 s = 8, L = 320
M a b Total a b Total
1 9.3% 5.3% 26.2% 8.0% 6.1% 25.4%
4 12.1% 7.4% 33.7% 10.9% 10.9% 37.0%
16 15.6% 10.9% 43.4% 11.3% 11.5% 38.4%
64 27.8% 14.7% 62.1% 17.3% 13.1% 48.4%
256 35.8% 20.1% 73.7% 18.0% 15.3% 51.8%
1024 41.5% 25.0% 80.7% 22.2% 14.5% 55.8%
Note that for s = 3, L = 256, we have that M = 16 with alternative
solution search gives success rates almost equal to those of M = 1024
(which is 64 times slower) without it, and that M = 1024 with alter-
native solution search results in success rate of about 80%.
It is also interesting to observe that while increasing the parameters
reduces the success rates, the success rates are significant even when
the maximal recommended parameters are taken.
Based on Table 7, we conclude that the Shpilrain-Ushakov cryptosys-
tem is broken, even if iterated up to one hundred times.
10. Conclusions
We have described several improvements on the standard length
based attack and its memory extensions. They include:
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(1) Avoiding repetitions, which is especially important in groups
such as Thompson’s group F , that are far from being free;
(2) Attacking each key multiple times, by applying each time a ran-
dom automorphism, or equivalently taking the length function
induced by such automorphisms;
(3) Looking for alternative solutions which are not necessarily the
ones used to generate the equations.
We have tested these improvements against the Shpilrain-Ushakov cryp-
tosystem, and in this case each of them increased the success proba-
bility substantially, with (1) being somewhat better than (2), and (3)
being a useful addition to any of these. It could be that for other
cryptosystems, (2) will prove to be better than (1).
The important advantage of our approach is that it is generic and can
be easily adjusted to any cryptosystem based on a group that admits
a reasonable length function on its elements. As such, we believe that
no cryptosystem leading to equations in a noncommutative group can
be considered secure before tested against these attacks.
It is a fascinating challenge to find an alternative platform group
where the attacks presented here fail. Such a platform may exist, and
the methods presented here should be useful for dismissing many of
the insecure candidates.
Acknowledgements. We thank Francesco Matucci for his useful com-
ments on this paper.
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